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ARGUMENT
I.
NEW YORK V. BELTON DOES NOT LIMIT ARIZONA V. GANT
WHERE, AS HERE, THERE ARE UNSECURED PASSENGERS.
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the United States Supreme Court
held that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of
an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile." Id. at 460. Belton is based on "the
generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger
compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within
'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary ite[m].'" Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).

Relying on Belton here, the State argued that defendant, a passenger in a
vehicle stopped for a traffic violation, was lawfully detained until all the lawful
objectives of the stop were completed, including searching the passenger
compartment incident to the driver's arrest. See Aple. Br. at 18-19 (citing Belton and
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1203 (Utah 1995) (recognizing Belton authorizes
officers to search arrested person and "his or her vehicle")). The Court heard oral
argument in this case, and a companion case, State v. Baker, Case No. 20080351-SC,
on 3 March 2009.
Since oral argument, the United States Supreme Court has issued Arizona v.
Gant,

U.S.

, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). Gant limits Belton and the authority of

police officers to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to the
driver's arrest.

Id. at 1714.

Under Gant, officers may search a passenger

compartment incident to the driver's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the vehicle at the time of the search, or there is reason to believe that the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Id. Here, the driver was secured in
a patrol car before officers attempted to search the passenger compartment. See R81
(a copy of the trial court's Ruling & Order is attached to the State's Brief of Appellee
at Addendum A). And the officers on the scene had no reason to believe that the car
contained evidence of the driver's suspended driving privilege. Therefore, neither
2

of Gant's stated justifications for searching the passenger compartment of a vehicle
incident to the driver's arrest is present here.
Before Gant, Belton allowed a search of the passenger compartment of the
vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, regardless of whether the arrestee was
secured. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 466,468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority rests on
" fiction . . . that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an
arrestee who has recently been in the car/' and asserting that under majority
approach, "the result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had
handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing them under
arrest"); see also Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1718,1719 (observing "Justice Brennan's reading of
[Belton] has predominated," and that "[ujnder this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle
search would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant
notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle's passenger compartment will not be
within the arrestee's reach at the time of the search").
Although Gant limits Belton, Gant does not limit Beltonfs application here,
because Gant is distinguishable on its facts. Unlike this case, Gant was the sole
occupant of his vehicle. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1715. Therefore, once Gant was
secured in the back of a patrol car, there was no danger he would reach into his own
car to grab a weapon or destroy evidence. Id. at 1719. Here, on the other hand, the
3

car in which defendant was a passenger had two other occupants, including the
driver. See R81. And only the driver was arrested and secured. See R81-80. As
pointed out by Justice Alito, "it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but
not all of the occupants of a vehicle." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1731, n.2 (Alito, J.,
dissenting, joined by Roberts, CJ., Kennedy, J., & Breyer, J.). As further noted by
Justice Alito, the Gant majority "does not address the question whether in such a
situation a search of the passenger compartment may be justified on the ground that
the occupants who are not arrested could gain access to the car and retrieve a
weapon or destroy evidence/' Id.
Accordingly, Gant does not limit Belton's application where, as here, there are
unsecured passengers. Indeed, unsecured passengers present the same danger as an
unsecured arrestee: one, or all of them, "could gain access to the car and retrieve a
weapon or destroy evidence." Id. Officers thus remain authorized to search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, where, as here,
there are unsecured passengers — regardless of whether the arrestee is secured. Cf.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. Therefore, defendant's detention pending the search of the
passenger compartment in this case—incident to the driver's arrest—was justified.
Arizona v. Johnson,

U.S.

, 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009), issued after briefing was

completed in this case, but before oral argument, further supports the lawfulness of
4

defendant's detention. In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court clarified that
passengers are reasonably detained incident to a traffic stop "for the duration of the
stop" or until "[officers] have no further need to control the scene, and inform the
driver and passengers they are free to leave/' 129 S.Ct at 788 (citing Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007)). As explained, Belton still applies when
unsecured passengers are present, even if the arrestee is secured. Officers were
therefore authorized to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle incident to
the driver's arrest here. It necessarily follows that the officers had "further need to
control the scene," or to detain the unsecured passengers until the passenger
compartment search could be safely concluded. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788. Any other
rule would unnecessarily jeopardize officer safety. The Fourth Amendment does
not require this.

See, e .g. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977)

(recognizing "too plain for argument" public interest in officer safety "both
legitimate and weighty").

5

II.
ARIZONA V. GANT IS A NEW RULE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
LAW THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION,
Even assuming arguendo that Gant controls here, Gant constitutes a clear
break with Belton, or a new rule of Fourth Amendment law, and should not
therefore have retroactive application.
In asserting that Gant should not apply retroactively here, the State recognizes
that in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the United States Supreme Court did
away with the "'clear break7 exception to the general proposition that new rules
governing criminal procedures should be retroactive to cases pending on direct
review/' Id. at 326, 328. Under the clear break exception, "a new constitutional rule
was not applied retroactively, even to cases on direct review, if the new rule
explicitly overruled a past precedent of [the] Court, or disapproved a practice [the]
Court had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or overturned a longstanding practice
that lower courts had uniformly approved/' Id. at 325 (citing United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982)).
In Griffith, the Supreme Court considered whether new rules regarding use of
peremptory challenges imposed in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied "to
litigation pending on direct state or federal review or not yet final when Batson was
decided/' Griffith, 479 U.S. at 316. Although the new peremptory challenge rules
6

imposed in Batson constituted a clear break with Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965), the Supreme Court declined to except Batson from the general rule of
retroactive application, holding instead that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on
direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule
constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id. at 328. In so holding, the Supreme
Court emphasized that application of the clear break exception resulted 1) in casespecific analysis that was inappropriate when deciding whether a new rule applied
retroactively to cases pending on direct review, and 2) in the uneven administration
of justice, because similarly situated defendants end up being treated dissimilarly.
M a t 327.
Because Griffith was a jury selection case, however, the Supreme Court did not
there consider the ramifications of applying new rules of Fourth Amendment law
retroactively. Where the remedy for a jury selection violation is a new trial, see id. at
319, the remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is suppression. See United States
v. Herring,

U.S.

, 129 S.Ct. 695, 699 (2009) ("[0]ur decisions establish an

exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained
evidence at trial"). "[The] judicially created [exclusionary] rule is 'designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect/" not to
7

make the defendant whole. Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348
(1974)).
Accordingly, the culpability of officer conduct must be considered when
analyzing the applicability of the exclusionary rule in a given case. Id. (citing United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.4 (1984)). The exclusionary rule applies only to
flagrant or deliberate Fourth Amendment violations, or "only if it can be said that
the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional." Id. at 701 (quoting Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987)). "The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation
occurred — i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable — does not necessarily mean
that the exclusionary rule applies." Id. at 700 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,223
(1983)). Indeed, exclusion is a "'last resort/" not a "'first impulse/" Id. (quoting
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)). Moreover, because the exclusionary
rule is not an individual right, it is applied only when it will effectively "deter[ ]
Fourth Amendment violations in the future." Id. (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347355; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)). Finally, "the benefits of deterrence
must outweigh the costs." Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 910). The exclusionary rule
should not therefore apply where it can provide only "marginal" or "incremental
deterrence." Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S.
8

357, 363 (1998) and Krull, 480 U.S. at 352-53). This is particularly true given the
"'substantial societal costs'77 of the rule, i.e., "letting guilty and possibly dangerous
defendants go free—something that 'offends basic concepts of the criminal justice
system/" Id. at 700-01 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 352-53 and Leon, 468 U.S. at 908).
Where, as here, officers were, at the time, authorized by Belton to conduct a
search of the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest, even if the
arrestee was secured, the "officers did nothing improper." Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 700.
Because there was no culpable conduct on the part of law enforcement officers when
they acted here, "'the extreme sanction of exclusion'" is unjustified. Id. (quoting
Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). This is true even if, in hindsight, a Fourth Amendment
violation in fact occurred, given Gant's subsequent limitation of Belton.
Indeed, in Herring, an officer relied on an arrest warrant that was
subsequently found to have been recalled, but which recall did not appear in the
computer database. Id. at 698. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred, but declined to apply the exclusionary rule to what
was at most a negligent failure to act, rather than a deliberate or tactical choice to
act: "[T]his error is not enough by itself to require 'the extreme sanction of
exclusion.'" Id. at 700 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916).

9

If the exclusionary rule does not apply to negligent officer conduct like that at
issue in Herring, it necessarily follows that it does not apply to non-culpable officer
conduct like that at issue here. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 (declining to apply
exclusionary rule to suppress fruits of warrantless administrative search performed
in good-faith reliance on statute later declared unconstitutional). Indeed, before
Gant, it was "widely accepted" that Belton authorized a search of the passenger
compartment of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, regardless of whether the
arrestee was secured. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1722, n. 11; see also United States v. Tliornton,
541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J., with Ginsburg, J., concurring) (observing "cases
involving this precise factual scenario — a motorist handcuffed and secured in the
back of a squad car when the search takes place — are legion"); State v. Harmon, 910
P.2d 1196,1203 (Utah 1995) ("[A]ny full custodial arrest, even for a misdemeanor
traffic violation, allows an officer to conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested
person,. . . and his or her vehicle," [Belton], 453 U.S. [at] 460"); Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), p.517, n.89 (4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2008-2009) (collecting
cases).
Going forward, Gant instructs law enforcement officers as to the limits of a
vehicle search incident to a driver's arrest, and violations of Gant will be subject to
the exclusionary rule. But applying the exclusionary rule to officer conduct that was
10

lawful before Gant "overturned a longstanding practice that lower courts had
uniformly approved/7 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 325, can have only marginal or
incremental deterrent value, if any. Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 700. It should not therefore
be applied here.
III.
DEFENDANTS POST-ARREST DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED
UNDER ARIZONA V. JOHNSON BECAUSE THERE WAS
FURTHER NEED TO CONTROL THE SCENE UNTIL DEPUTY
RADMALL COULD SAFELY RELEASE CHILDS' CAR TO AN
AUTHORIZED DRIVER, OR OTHERWISE SECURE IT,
Even assuming that Gant applies when there are unsecured passengers, and
that Gant has retroactive application, defendant's detention while the passenger
compartment was searched incident to the driver's arrest was nonetheless justified
because neither he nor Childs could legally drive Childs7 car. There was, therefore,
further need to control the scene until Childs' car could be safely released to an
authorized driver, moved to a lawful temporary parking space, or impounded.
As set forth in Point I, the United States Supreme Court clarified in Arizona
v. Johnson, that passengers are reasonably detained incident to a traffic stop "for
the duration of the stop" or until "[officers] have no further need to control the
scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave." 129 S.Ct. at
788 (citing California v. Brendlin, 551 U.S. 249,258 (2007)). In so clarifying, the

11

Supreme Court re-emphasized that "'"[t]he risk of harm to both the police and
the occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is minimized,... if the officers routinely
exercise unquestioned command of the situation."" Id. at 786 (quoting Maryland
v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (in turn quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 702-03 (1981)) and citing Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 258) (second brackets in
original).
Here, there was further need to control the scene following the driver's arrest.
Neither defendant nor Childs had a valid driver's license; therefore, neither of them
could lawfully drive Childs' vehicle. See R81. Deputy Radmall was thus required to
remain with Childs' car until he or another officer could safely drive it to a lawful
temporary parking area, release it to an authorized driver, or impound it. Cf State v.
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,268-69 (Utah 1985) (recognizing where passenger had no valid
license, impounding car without first allowing arrestee/owner to arrange for thirdparty to move it, as per department policy, was unreasonable). Since Deputy
Radmall would have to deal with Childs' car one way or another, there was
necessarily "further need to control the scene," until he could do so safely. Johnson,
129 S.Ct. at 788. Cf People v. Hoyos, 162 P.3d 528, 546 (Cal. 2007) (upholding
detention of driver and passenger reasonably seized following Mimms/Wilson order
to exit vehicle "at least as long as reasonably necessary for the officer to complete
12

the activity [an inventory search] iheMimms/Wilson order contemplates"). As noted
in the State's opening brief, the important interest in officer safety is of special
significance during traffic stops, which "may be dangerous encounters/' and even
more so, when, as here, unsecured passengers are present. Aple. Br. at 10 (quoting
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413); see also Aple. Br. at 11-14 (collecting cases and pertinent
statistics).
In sum, the trial court's ruling may be upheld on the alternative ground that
there was further need to control the scene, including detaining defendant, until
Deputy Radmall could safely release the car to an authorized driver, secure it
temporarily in a public parking space, or impound it. See State v. Robison, 2006 UT
65, Tj 19, 147 P.3d 448 (recognizing appellate court may affirm judgment below
where sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on record, even though
such ground or theory not considered by lower court).
IV.
DEFENDANTS POST-ARREST DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED
UNDER ILLINOIS V. CABALLES BECAUSE THE DOG SNIFF DID
NOT PROLONG THE TRAFFIC STOP BEYOND THE TIME
REASONABLY REQUIRED TO COMPLETE IT.
Finally, assuming arguendo that defendant's detention while the passenger
compartment was searched incident to the driver's arrest was not justified under
either Gant or Johnson, only a minute and a half elapsed between the driver's arrest
13

and the canine alert on the exterior of Childs' car. See Rl94:13,22-23 (A copy of the
preliminary hearing transcript is attached to Aple. Br. at Addendum B). This slight
delay was de minimis and did not, therefore, constitute a Fourth Amendment
violation.
In Illinois v. Caballes, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
deploying a canine during a traffic stop is permissible so long as it does not
prolong the traffic stop "beyond the time reasonably required'' to complete it.
543 U.S. 405,407 (2005); accord State v. Wilkinson, 2008 UT App 395, Tf8; 197 P.3d
96 (rejecting claim that "request for a canine unit unreasonably extended the
duration of Wilkinson's detention") (emphasis in original).
Here, extending the traffic stop a mere ninety seconds for a dog sniff falls well
within the parameters of de minimis conduct. Even prior to Caballes, lower courts
upheld suspicionless dog sniffs conducted, as here, at the conclusion of a traffic stop
on the ground that the few additional minutes taken were de minimis. See, e.g.,
United States v. Herrera Martinez, 354 F.3d 932, 934 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding "short
detention for dog sniff after completion of traffic stop [does not] violate Fourth
Amendment"); United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th
Cir. 1999) (upholding thirty-second to two-minute suspicionless dog sniff conducted
at conclusion of traffic stop); State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623, 630 (Ariz. App. 2003)
14

(upholding post-stop dog sniff on ground Box was "only slightly inconvenienced
when he was further detained for less than a minute while the dog sniffed his
vehicle"); State v. De La Rosa, 657 N. W.2d 683,687 (S.D. 2003) (holding post-stop dog
sniff not unreasonable because "sniffing activity was of short duration/' or "a matter
of seconds"); see also id. at n.3 (collecting pre-Caballes cases where courts upheld
similarly de minimis suspicionless investigations).
Since Caballes, courts continue to uphold similarly brief post-traffic stop
canine sniffs.

See United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005)

(upholding thirty seconds to two minute post-stop dog sniff); United States v.
Caiyenter, 406 F.3d 915, 916-17 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding possible five-minute wait
during routine traffic stop for drug-detection dog not unreasonable); Hugueley v.
Dresden Police Department, 469 F.Supp.2d 507, 513 (W.D. Term. 2007) (upholding
post-stop dog sniff that took no more than two and one-half minutes).

As

recognized by Professor LaFave, because dog sniffs take "so little time," courts are
"willing to employ a 'fudge factor' regarding the temporal limits of the traffic stop;
if the dog sniff is conducted immediately or soon after completion of those tasks
actually connected with the traffic violation, the resulting additional custody is
deemed so de minimis as to be of no consequence." Wayne R. LaFave, Search &
Seizure § 9.3(f) at 399 & n.231 (4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2008-2009) (collecting cases).
15

In sum, because defendant's detention after the driver's arrest and before the
drug dog alerted on Childs' car was de minimis, no Fourth Amendment violation
occurred here. The trial court's ruling may be upheld on this alternative ground.
See Robison, 2006 UT 65, f 19.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted 28 May 2009.
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Utah Attorney General
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